bomb' situation never occurs in real life, or very rarely. But on this show it happens every week." 2 The show is so compelling that the dean of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, went to see its creators in California to ask them to portray interrogation situations that more closely reflect reality. Military cadets were so enamored of the show that it was difficult to get them to accept the professional military doctrine that follows the U.S. rule of law and the laws of war. Finnegan said , "I'd like them to stop. They should do a show where torture backfires." 3 The most convincing argument that torture may be necessary is the "ticking time bomb" scenario featured on 24. Yet, blanket condemnations of torture are often countered with this type of hypothetical situation. 4 In such a case, the argument goes, torture is necessary in order to save innocent lives. 5 However, there is a chain of premises upon which such a scenario rests. First, there must be good intelligence that a planned attack exists and that the bomb is currently ticking. Second, the "right person" must be captured. Third, the captive must have detailed knowledge of the attack. (Terrorist cells typically practice good operational security.) Fourth, torture must be the best way to extract accurate information. (Many experienced interrogators argue that civil treatment is more effective, and note that a captive might say anything to stop the pain or might deliberately deceive the interrogators.) Fifth, the captive must divulge the information quickly to allow an imminent attack from taking place. (Hurried interrogations do not necessarily produce the best information, and they can result in unintended death of the detainee.) Finally, the information obtained must be actionable, and the means to prevent an attack must exist.
If any one of these premises is absent or incorrect, or if the problems cited exist, torture will not solve the problem. Thus, even if one posits that torture might be justified in order to save innocent lives-as in the simple and rare version of the ticking bomb scenario-most torture scenarios are ruled out. The further a situation is removed from the ticking bomb scenario, the less torture is justified. Some argue that even if no ticking bomb is found, the lives of soldiers may be saved if intelligence about an adversary's location is discovered through torture. This type of argument, however, can be made in almost any combat situation. Enemy captives might conceivably have information that might help, and torture might be justified by any nation in any armed conflict. Nevertheless, this kind of justification of torture to extract tactical information is precisely the reason that rules of warfare banning torture have developed over the centuries, and why the United States is a party to the Geneva conventions. The generally accepted rules of warfare forbid torture and provide for the humane treatment of enemy captives. Without these rules, all armed forces would be vulnerable to torture if captured by the enemy; therefore, all sides have long had a stake in banning the use of torture.
range of interrogation techniques-from friendly trickery to the most extreme infliction of pain-the results are mixed. 6 Approaches that work with some people do not work with others. Even if people are forced to talk, they may not tell the truth. They may say whatever it takes to stop the pain. Willie J. Rowell, an Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agent for thirty-six years, is dubious about torture's efficacy. "They'll tell you what you want to hear, truth or not truth." 7 The army field manual on interrogations stated (before revisions in 2006), "Army interrogation experts view the use of force as an inferior technique that yields information of questionable quality. The primary concerns, in addition to the effect on information quality, are the adverse effect on future interrogations and the behavioral change on those being interrogated." 8 In testimony before Congress in March 2005, Porter Goss, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said, "As I said publicly before, and I know for a fact, that torture is not-it's not productive. . . . That's not professional interrogation. We don't do torture." 9 The army field manual was revised in 2006, and harsh techniques to obtain intelligence continue to be forbidden. The Bush administration, however, grants more leeway to the CIA for interrogations. They can use harsher methods, but what those methods are has not been made public.
Several British detainees at Guantanamo said that they were tortured in order to force them to admit that they went to Afghanistan to fight a holy war and that they were in a video of Osama bin Laden in 2000. They denied that they had been involved in these activities, but said that they confessed to stop the pain and ill-treatment. They were finally exonerated when British Intelligence produced proof that they were not in Afghanistan at the time the video was made. 10 Thus, even if one posits that torture might be justified in a very limited number of scenarios, there is much professional opinion and empirical evidence that torture is not necessarily effective in gaining accurate and timely information.
Behavioral Dimensions of Torture
In the wake of the publication of the Abu Ghraib photographs and other accounts of the abuse of prisoners, many citizens asked, "How could these acts have been committed by U.S. soldiers?" Part of the answer is that most human beings are heavily influenced by their immediate social setting. U.S. military training includes army doctrine on the legitimate uses of violence and on the provisions of the Geneva Accords with regard to prisoners; the Accords prohibit torture. What then, went wrong? How could U.S. soldiers commit the terrible acts that have been recorded in photographs and reported throughout the world? Several behavioral science experiments help to explain the dynamics of human behavior in institutional settings.
In trying to understand how the Holocaust could have occurred in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, scholars have offered a number of explanations. Sadly, it has become clear that the actions necessary to exterminate Jews in large numbers were carried out in part by ordinary people (military and civilian), and not merely In Unmasking Administrative Evil, Guy Adams and Danny Balfour explain how public administrators can contribute to evil acts simply by conscientiously performing their assigned duties. Their argument is that large-scale evil is often masked; that is, perpetrators see themselves as merely doing their duty conscientiously and do not believe they are doing anything wrong. Their acts cumulatively, however, can result in an evil outcome, as in the Holocaust. 12 In the 1960s, Yale University psychologist Stanley Milgram designed an experiment that intended to show that Americans would not be as compliant as were Germans when asked to inflict pain on other human beings. In his experiment the subject was told that he was participating in an experiment about the connection between electrical shock and memory. The subject was supposed to deliver a shock to a person (in reality, an actor) in the next room every time an incorrect response was given. The shocks were calibrated from 15 volts to 450 volts, and as the supposed voltage of the shocks was increased, the actor expressed increased pain. If the subject hesitated to administer the next level of shock, the experimenter, with the help of a white lab coat and the voice of scientific authority, prompted the subject to apply the shock despite the screams of pain from the actor in the next room. Ninety-nine percent of the subjects were willing to administer the "strong" shock of 135 volts, and 62 percent were willing to go to the "XXX" category of 435 and 450 volts. 13 This classic experiment demonstrated that ordinary Americans, with their individualistic cultural values, were not so different from Germans. One of the lessons of this experiment is that Americans would go much further than was predicted (by Milgram) along a path of inflicting pain when it appeared to be sanctioned by science and authority.
Another classic experiment on the malleability of Americans' behavior was conducted at Stanford University in the 1970s. The purpose of the experiment was to examine the effect of adopted roles in organizational behavior. The experimenters selected what they determined to be twenty-two normal undergraduate men and randomly assigned them to be either jailors or prisoners in a simulated prison set up in the basement of the psychology building. The "ground rules" were that the prisoners would be treated as prisoners, but would not be subject to any inhumane treatment. The experiment had to be terminated after six days rather than the planned two weeks because of the brutality and mistreatment by the "guards."
Again, this experimental evidence illustrates how seemingly ordinary and normal people can easily be led to commit inhumane behavior. In this case the conditions were only an imagined "prison" environment. The "guards" knew the "prisoners" were guilty of nothing but were acting a part. The experimenters concluded, "In less than a week, the experience of a 'prison' environment undid (temporarily) a lifetime of learning; human values were suspended, self-concepts were challenged and the ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature surfaced. We were horrified because we saw some boys ('guards') treat other boys as if they were despicable animals, taking pleasure in cruelty." 14   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46 164 JAMES P. PFIFFNER
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Given these classic experiments, we should not be surprised that good, normal, young, military men and women would be capable of inhumane behavior. Indeed, their behavior may have been aggravated because they were guarding prisoners of a different racial/cultural background who they may have believed had been guilty of attacks on U.S. forces. This is why rules, regulations, and strict adherence to standard operating procedures are so important in military prisons. Systematic training must overcome the immediate environment.
The Importance of Leadership
In large organizations, and particularly in the military, leadership is essential. Effective leadership can harness a large organization to work effectively toward a goal, and poor leadership can result in a competent organization being unable to act effectively. With respect to torture, if its unjust use is to be avoided, strong leadership is necessary. In the case of U.S. torture during the war on terror, leadership throughout the chain of command failed. The chain created the conditions under which torture occurred. As the war in Afghanistan proceeded, a substantial number of prisoners were captured, and the United States needed a place to imprison them and to interrogate members of al Qaeda who might have knowledge about future attacks. The naval station at Guantanamo Bay on the island of Cuba was chosen because it was isolated from the mainland; and while it was clearly under U.S. control, the administration argued that it was not U.S. territory and thus did not fall under the jurisdiction of U.S. courts (a legal argument that has since been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court). (Kenneth Harbaugh's chapter in this book provides the larger legal context for this.)
On January 25, 2002, the White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales, wrote a memo to President Bush, arguing that the Geneva conventions for the treatment of prisoners of war and other captives did not apply to al Qaeda captives. He reasoned that the war on terrorism was "a new kind of war" and that the "new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners." 15 Secretary of State Colin Powell objected to Gonzales's reasoning and replied in a memo dated January 26, 2002 , in which he argued that the drawbacks to not applying the Geneva conventions outweighed the advantages because "it will reverse over a century of policy . . . and undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in this specific conflict and in general; it has a high cost in terms of negative international reaction. . . .[and it] will undermine public support among critical allies." 16 Despite Powell's memo, President Bush signed a memorandum on February 7, 2002 , that stated, "Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief . . . I determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva." The president also noted, "Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment." 17 The president's decision led to the expansion 18 about allowable interrogation techniques, and also via the "migration" of those techniques to Iraq, which, unlike Guantanamo, the United States considers to be covered by the Geneva conventions. 19 In addition to the decisions about harsh techniques that were allowable during interrogations, administration lawyers produced analyses that defined torture very narrowly and argued that the president's authority as commander in chief of the armed forces allowed him to ignore laws meant to forbid torture. On August 1, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), signed a memorandum dealing with what would constitute torture under Title 18 of the U.S. Code (criminal law), which applied the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the United States. 20 The OLC memo construed the definition of torture narrowly: "We conclude that for an act to constitute torture, it must inflict pain that is . . . equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death." This narrow definition would allow a wide range of brutal actions that do not meet the exacting requirements specified in the memo. The memo specifically excludes from torture "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment," some examples of which are specified: wall standing, hooding, noise, sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink. But the memo did specify that some practicessuch as severe beatings with clubs, threats of imminent death, threats of removing extremities, burning, electric shocks to genitalia, and rape or sexual assaultwould be torture. Later, when Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers in the Pentagon learned about the memo, they objected to the loosening of the restraints on torture.
After six months of experience at Guantanamo following the traditional rules, military officials became frustrated because of their inability to extract what they considered valuable intelligence. According to one military official, "We'd been at this for a year-plus and got nothing out of them," so it was concluded that "we need to have a less-cramped view of what torture is and is not." 21 Major General Michael B. Dunlavey forwarded the requested changes and justified them by arguing that the normal field manual techniques "have become less effective over time." 22 His request was forwarded to Secretary Rumsfeld by Defense Department (DoD) general counsel William J. Haynes II on November 27, 2002, with the recommendation that seventeen new techniques in several categories be authorized. 23 In December 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld approved additional techniques that could be used against detainees who refused to talk. 24 In 2004, former secretary of defense James Schlesinger headed an independent panel, appointed by Secretary Rumsfeld, which was tasked with finding the cause of the incidents at Abu Ghraib. 25 The Schlesinger Report concluded, "It is clear that pressure for additional intelligence and the more aggressive methods sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense resulted in stronger interrogation techniques." 26 Some of the techniques approved at Guantanamo violated the Geneva conventions (e.g., stress position, up to thirty days of isolation, and removal of clothing). 27 Most of the techniques did not amount to torture, though some of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46 them were harsh and might amount to torture, depending on the intensity and application (e.g., thirty-day isolations, sensory deprivation, twenty-hour interrogations, and noninjurious physical contact). 28 According to the Wall Street Journal, techniques that were used included deprivation of food, deprivation of sleep (for up to ninety-six hours), deprivation of clothing, and shackling in stress positions. 29 The problem, of course, is that in the actual practice of interrogations, as was evident at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, guards and interrogators can get carried away and move beyond the boundaries specified in the legal memoranda. Ensuring that this does not happen is the obligation of those in leadership positions.
Despite the use of additional interrogation techniques at Guantanamo, no ticking time bomb plots were discovered (that we know of), though some useful intelligence was obtained. According to some defense officials, of the approximately six hundred men imprisoned at Guantanamo, only one-third to one-half of the inmates seemed to be of value. 30 The harsh interrogation practices, however, had meanwhile been exported to Abu Ghraib and used there, despite the fact that the war in Iraq was covered by the Geneva Agreements, as the administration admitted. General Geoffrey Miller, who was in charge of interrogation at Guantanamo, was assigned to Abu Ghraib to improve intelligence collection. General Janice Karpinski, who had been in charge of Abu Ghraib, said that Miller was sent to "Gitmo-ize" Abu Ghraib. 31 In addition to official memoranda and executive directives, leadership was also provided through public statements by high-level officials. Even if low-level perpetrators of torture do not directly hear the statements, the impact of authoritative public statements is far-reaching. Mid-level officials in the administration and in the military take the statements seriously as expressions of policy and of the attitudes of top officials. They then pass down the chain of command the directives and the attitudes conveyed in public statements. In this case, leadership conveyed the administration's point of view concerning detainees and permissible treatment of them.
President Bush, in talking about the detainees at Guantanamo, declared, "They're dangerous and they're still around, and they'll kill in a moment's notice." 32 Vice President Cheney said, "These are the worst of a very bad lot. . . . They are very dangerous. They are devoted to killing millions of Americans, innocent Americans, if they can, and they are perfectly prepared to die in the effort. And they need to be detained, treated very cautiously, so that our people are not at risk." 33 On January 27, 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said just before he left for Guantanamo, "These are among the most dangerous, best trained vicious killers on the face of the earth. And that means that the people taking care of these detainees and managing their transfer have to be just exceedingly careful for two reasons. One, for their own protection, but also so these people don't get loose back out on the street and kill more people. This is a very, very serious business and it ought to be treated in that manner. . . . They are not POWs, they will not be determined to be POWs." 34 Statements like these, coming from those who were the most authoritative government officials and who should have been the most knowledgeable about 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46   THE ETHICS OF INTERROGATION the war on terror, were almost certain to dispose U.S. personnel in charge of the detainees to treat them as if they were complicit in the 9/11 atrocities and were actively seeking to kill scores of American civilians. In combination with official changes in policy, these kinds of statements helped to create the conditions under which torture was conducted.
Some of the U.S. captives were guilty of supporting al Qaeda and of resisting U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The reality, however, was that not all of the prisoners held at Guantanamo were in fact enemy belligerents or had information that the U.S. could use to prevent future attacks. Indeed, Major General Michael Dunlavey, who was in charge of investigations at Guantanamo, estimated that up to half of the prisoners did not possess any intelligence of value to the United States. 35 One of the reasons that many prisoners were of little intelligence value and may not have participated in hostilities toward the United States was the way in which they came to be captives of the United States. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces depended on Afghan locals to capture and interrogate suspected hostile forces. This dependency was compounded by the substantial bounties placed on the heads of U.S. enemies. The United States offered $5,000 for each Taliban member and $20,000 for each al Qaeda member brought into U.S. custody, and Secretary Rumsfeld said that leaflets advertising these offers were "dropping like snowflakes in December in Chicago." 36 With incentives like these, it does not take much imagination to figure out that some Afghanis would relish not only giving up their tribal enemies, but also profiting from doing so.
In 2002 there were so many prisoners arriving from Afghanistan of little intelligence value that Major General Dunlavey actually went to Afghanistan to "chew us out" in the words of one U.S. officer. Dunlavey complained that many of those sent to Guantanamo were "Mickey Mouse" types in terms of their military or intelligence value. Some U.S. personnel in Afghanistan then tried to alleviate the problem by drawing up a list of fifty-nine detainees who were innocent, who were not dangerous, or who had little intelligence value. Nevertheless, the danger of making even one mistake was so high that all fifty-nine ended up being sent to Guantanamo. Once in Guantanamo, it was very difficult to get out. Indeed, a U.S. spokesperson in the Pentagon denied the presence of any detainees who should not have been in Guantanamo: "All are considered enemy combatants lawfully detained in accordance with the law of armed conflict." 
Conclusion: The Consequences of Torture
It is notable that the justifications of, and pressure to use, torture came from civilians in the Bush administration who did not have significant military experience. The highest-level person who objected to the use of these methods was Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had had a professional military career and had seen combat in Vietnam. In addition, many in the JAG Corps of the army objected to the suspension of the Geneva conventions and the use of harsh interrogation methods. They favored the traditional policies that U.S. forces had   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46 taken toward captured enemies from the time of George Washington until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is further notable that military personnel brought "torture scandals" to light and helped put an end to them. 38 It is important here to note that torture of prisoners has probably happened in most wars in which the United States has participated. What is different about the war on terror is that the president of the United States, by suspending the Geneva conventions in February 2002, established a policy that set the conditions that led to the torture of prisoners. In addition, President Bush threatened to veto the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which forbade torture and which was sponsored by John McCain (who was tortured as a POW in Hanoi). When the bill passed Congress with veto-proof majorities, the president, in signing the bill, issued a signing statement declaring that he would enforce the law only when it did not interfere with his own constitutional prerogatives, which he did not specify. The next year, in arguing for passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, President Bush argued that "the program" of harsh interrogation methods used by the CIA was essential to U.S. security in the war on terror.
President Bush's perspective stands in stark contrast to the statements by former generals Charles C. Krulak and Joseph P. Hoar when they wrote the following:
Any degree of "flexibility" about torture at the top drops down the chain of command like a stone-the rare exception fast becoming the rule. . . . This has had disastrous consequences. . . . This war will be won or lost not on the battlefield but in the minds of potential supporters who have not yet thrown in their lot with the enemy. . . . This way lies defeat, and we are well down the road to it. . . . Before the president once again approves a policy of official cruelty, he should reflect on that. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46 Conflict in Afghanistan," pp. 2, 4. The memo is printed in Greenberg and Dratel, Torture Papers, pp. 122-125. Many of the memoranda and oral directives included statements that detainees were to be treated "humanely" despite the more aggressive interrogation techniques to which they could be subjected. The problem was that if the detainees were in fact treated humanely, it would be more difficult to extract information from them. Thus, these statements must have been considered to be pro forma, while the overall thrust of the directives was that detainees were to be subject to more aggressive interrogation techniques that were outside the Geneva Convention limits. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46   THE ETHICS OF INTERROGATION 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45 
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